Media on IDF ploy: announced ground operation in Gaza and attacked tunnels where militants
(22) Media on IDF ploy: announced ground operation in Gaza and attacked tunnels where militants were hidi: ext_5322906 — LiveJournal
“Duvdevan”, “Samson”, “Shaldag”, “Matkal”, “Shayetet 13”, “YAMAM”, “YAMAS” and others.
Soldiers of Spetsnaaz of Israel
On the same day, upon learning of what had happened, Israeli officials announced that in fact they were "accidentally lost soldiers on vacation." In response to this killing of "innocent ordinary soldiers", Israeli armored units surrounded Palestinian settlements, and army helicopters launched missile and bomb attacks on Palestinian positions, including the residence of Palestine Liberation Organization leader Yasser Arafat. Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak announced: "Now the Israeli army has a free hand." The barely outlined truce was broken again.
Husama el-Amin. This, incidentally, is not the first time such a tactic of action. Six years earlier, the leader of the pro-Iranian Shiite extremist organization Hezbollah, Abas Mussavi, was killed by the launch of a guided missile from an Apache helicopter. The accuracy of missile guidance in both cases was ensured by the Israeli Air Force special forces Sayeret Shaddag using laser designators. The latest technical means are also used. On 16 August 1999, two powerful explosive charges placed on the side of a road near the port of Sidon in southern Lebanon killed the head of Hezbollah's military operations, Ali Diyb (Abu Hassan). Although Israeli officials deny their involvement in this operation, witnesses say that at that moment an Israeli unmanned aerial vehicle was circling over the site of the explosion.
There is no need to talk in detail about all the methods of action of the Israeli special forces. All over the world, they are about the same. However, I would like to dwell on the actions of one of these units participating in the fight against terrorists.
The Sayeret Duvdevan Special Forces Unit (“Unit 217”) was established in 1988. A year later, a similar division, Sayeret Shimshon, appeared. Both units were subordinate to the General Staff and were intended to organize the search, arrest or destruction of terrorists and the release of hostages in areas of compact settlement of Palestinians. The area of responsibility of the first subdivision is the district of Rzmalla, the second subdivision operated in the Gaza Strip. In 1994, after the Gaza Strip came under Palestinian control as a result of an agreement between Israel and the PLO, the Sayeret Shimshon unit was disbanded. Another name for these divisions is "Mistaravim", which means "to become an Arab" in Hebrew. This name is the essence of these units. Taking into account the specifics of the area of operations, the servicemen of the Mistaravim unit are constantly operating, disguising themselves as local residents - Arabs. And literally everything is masked: weapons, vehicles, communications and surveillance. Although the areas of their operations were controlled by the Israelis, these units were there in a semi-legal position.
The Israeli military command decided to revive such units again after the 1987 Arab uprising in the occupied territories, dubbed the "intifada". The demonstrations of the Arab population were massive. Numerous, well-armed terrorists enjoyed the support of the local population. Attempts by the Israeli command to use ordinary special forces did not bring success, since they had to openly operate in densely populated areas with a strongly opposed population. As a rule, an Israeli unit moving into the task area was detected in the early stages of the operation (even if it happened at night), since the soldiers acted in their usual form and used weapons other than those of the terrorists. By that time, when the Israeli special forces arrived at the scene, the suspect, warned by his own, managed to escape. It was then that the Israelites remembered the experience of the forties.
- 4 months of studying the tactics and specifics of the actions of his unit, including, among other disciplines, the study of the Arabic language, the history and cultural customs of the Arabs, the psychology of their behavior. Methods of disguise "as Arabs" are being carefully studied: wearing Arabic clothes, using wigs, false beards and mustaches, contact lenses to change the color of the eyes, make-up, etc. Dressing up in women's clothing is often used as one of the means of disguise. This is due, firstly, to the fact that in the Arab world women have a very low social status, they are not afraid, and they can move freely everywhere without attracting attention, especially if they wear traditional Arab religious clothes of a married woman. Secondly, it is convenient to hide weapons, especially powerful long-barreled ones, as well as communications equipment, under wide Arab women's clothing. observation, etc. Since Duvedevan fighters often work in pairs, they learn to portray a married couple.
The current prime minister of Israel also had a good command of the art of disguising as a woman. In the aforementioned Operation Second Youth, he and two other special forces officers disguised as women managed to approach the sentries guarding the terrorists' headquarters and destroy several of them using silenced pistols. Sometimes, however, overlays happen with such a disguise. For example, during one of the operations at the most crucial moment, when the disguised fighters were among the Palestinians, one of them had a fake mustache peeled off. Then everything happened as in the movie "The Diamond Arm". With the words "your mustache is unstuck," a boy jumped up to the soldier, and he barely managed to get away from the crowd of Palestinians pursuing him. By the way, even the traditional Arab men's and women's clothing was "modernized" by the commandos
Since service in a unit assumes a constant presence among a hostile population and all kinds of clashes are inevitable, a lot of time during preparation and service is devoted to practicing hand-to-hand combat techniques. Moreover, training fights are held, as a rule, in full contact with the minimum restrictions necessary for safety and protective equipment. Israeli experts believe that mastery of hand-to-hand combat techniques helps to avoid unnecessary use of weapons when operating in a crowd, among civilians. It should be noted that in the Israel Defense Forces, training in hand-to-hand combat is significantly different from most armies in the world. Hand-to-hand combat techniques are studied only in airborne and special units. According to Israeli military experts,
Newcomers who arrived at Duvedevan after completing their training are enrolled in one of the groups formed according to the principle of a single military specialty: a group of drivers, snipers, etc. When carrying out an operation, the command staffs an operational group, to which the most trained and most combat-ready specialists are assigned at the moment. Usually it can include up to eight people, the operations are carefully worked out, the most recent aerial photographs of the area, taken several hours before the operation, are carefully studied. If necessary, training is carried out on the ground. One of the journalists who managed to secretly observe such a teaching described what he saw. “In an area hidden from prying eyes, a fake Palestinian village has been built, with plywood facades and live donkeys in paddocks. From the same plywood mosque, the muezzin's prayer was heard through loudspeakers. Behind the facade, the soldiers changed their olive uniforms for jeans, T-shirts, sweaters. Then they glued on false beards and made up like Arabs. Another group depicted "Palestinians" throwing stones at a military jeep and setting a car protector on fire in the street. Suddenly, two of the “protesters” against the “Israeli arbitrariness” seized the leader of the “Palestinians” group, immediately strangling him and threw him into an approaching “Meregsk”, which drove away at high speed, and the trunks protruded from the windows of the car that had driven away. Another group depicted "Palestinians" throwing stones at a military jeep and setting a car protector on fire in the street. Suddenly, two of the "protesters" against the "Israeli arbitrariness" seized the leader of the "Palestinians" group, immediately strangling him and threw him into an approaching "Meregzk", which drove away at high speed, and the trunks protruded from the windows of the car that had driven away. Another group depicted "Palestinians" throwing stones at a military jeep and setting a car protector on fire in the street. Suddenly, two of the "protesters" against the "Israeli arbitrariness" seized the leader of the "Palestinians" group, immediately strangling him and threw him into an approaching "Meregzk", which drove away at high speed, and the trunks protruded from the windows of the car that had driven away.
Silencers are needed to ensure stealth. Especially often, such weapons are used to destroy dogs that are overflowing with cities in the occupied territories. Dogs are a good "safety signaling device" when they raise their barks long before the task force approaches the site of the operation, especially at night. After several unsuccessful operations, which were thwarted by dogs, there is always at least one person in the task force with a weapon with a silencer. His task is to destroy dogs that can warn the enemy ahead of time about an attack. By the way, the presence of one or two dead dogs with a bullet in the head at the site of Operation Duvedevan has become a kind of calling card of this unit.
The machines that are used in the Duvedevan division are outwardly no different from those used by the locals. Basically the same old models as theirs. They have local numbers and "official" documents so as not to arouse suspicion even among the Israeli soldiers checking them. But the internal stuffing of the cars does not match their appearance: powerful forced engines with turbocharging. bulletproof glass, reinforced front and rear bumpers (so that if necessary, go to the ram). In addition, in order to secretly transport weapons, special caches are equipped in the cars.
The performance of both Mistaravim units was impressive. If in 1990 there were several hundred active members of Arab terrorist organizations hiding in places of compact residence of Palestinians (“wanted” in Israeli terminology) were registered with the Israeli special services, then in 1995 there were only a few dozen of them. Most of them were killed during the arrests, as fanatical terrorists put up stubborn resistance, preferring death to Israeli captivity. This, incidentally, was the reason to call the Mistaravim units the assassin squads, after in 1992 the General Staff of the IDF for the first time publicly announced the existence and activities of these units. In the most tense period of the Arab "intifada" (1989-1995), not a day passed when one or both units did not carry out operations to neutralize terrorists. In addition to the physical reduction in the number of "wanted" ones, the result of the activities of these units was a psychological impact on existing and potential terrorists who do not feel safe even among the loyal local population.
Such an intense rhythm of service in these units, as well as the need to constantly impersonate another person, often led to the fact that at the end of the service those who retired to the reserve experienced mental trauma and nervous breakdowns. Many of them could no longer find a place for themselves in a calm post-war life and, in order to somehow realize themselves, came to serve in special police units or private security structures. The servicemen of these units were also affected by heavy, exhausting training, especially in hand-to-hand combat. Several people have been disabled as a result of training injuries, and broken ribs, shattered noses and concussions have become commonplace. In addition, there have been cases
The impressive results of the activities of the Duvedevan and Shimshon units led to the fact that they began to conduct their operations independently, without informing not only local law enforcement agencies, but also related special forces of the armed forces. As a result, there have been several cases in which fighters from these units entered into firefights with other military personnel who mistook them for Arab terrorists. And once the task force "Duvedevan" entered into battle with the soldiers of another special unit of the Defense Forces, when both units independently of each other simultaneously carried out an operation on the same object. This and other clashes resulted in casualties on both sides. It happened that the inconsistency in the unit itself also led to sad results. So, for example, on August 27, 2000.
Even at the beginning of the activities of the Mistaravim units, their command came to the conclusion that the most effective actions are carried out not at night, but during the day, when the “wanted” ones relax and allow themselves to appear in public places. It was a good idea to use the uniform of the Palestinian police, which began to operate widely in the occupied territories in 1992-1993, to disguise. This was facilitated by the fact that the Palestinian police were arming themselves mainly with Western weapons instead of the Kalashnikov assault rifles traditionally widespread in these areas. Witnesses of such operations could take everything at face value, they say the police are missing another "accomplice" of the Israelis.
In addition to its main mission, the Duvedevan unit is also involved in the tasks of freeing hostages and conducting counter-terrorist operations. In accordance with the organization adopted in Israel for the fight against terrorism and the taking of hostages, all units involved in such tasks are divided into assault, support and auxiliary. Assault are those that directly release hostages or capture (destroy) terrorists. These include anti-terrorist groups specially created as part of the special forces of the Defense Forces "Sayeret Matkal" and "Flotilla 13" ("Subdivision 269" and "D 4", respectively), as well as the Israeli police special force "Yaamam". All these units have their own area of responsibility, within which they conduct their operations. For example, "Yaamam" operates on the territory of Israel, and the anti-terrorist group of the "Saysret Metkal" unit - abroad. Support units are units for which the fight against terrorism is not the main task, although their personnel also receive the necessary training. Basically, these are various units of the Special Forces of the Defense Forces. Their task: upon arrival at the site of the operation, cordon off (as far as possible) the surrounding area, prevent outsiders from entering the cordoned off area, including reinforcements for terrorists, or the exit of terrorists from the blocked area, as well as collect as much information as possible before arrival an assault unit assigned to carry out the operation. The support unit can start releasing hostages and storming terrorists on their own, without waiting for the arrival of the main forces, only if the terrorists began to kill the hostages. Each of these units also operates within its own area of responsibility, which geographically coincide with the military districts. When conducting an anti-terrorist operation outside Israel, the one that best suits the task at hand (in terms of its capabilities), regardless of its area of responsibility, is chosen as a "support" unit. The Duvedevan subdivision, which is one of the "support", was repeatedly involved in such tasks, sometimes successfully, sometimes not. When conducting an anti-terrorist operation outside Israel, the one that best (in terms of its capabilities) corresponds to the task at hand, regardless of its area of responsibility, is chosen as a "support" unit. The Duvedevan subdivision, which is one of the "support", was repeatedly involved in such tasks, sometimes successfully, sometimes not. When conducting an anti-terrorist operation outside Israel, the one that best (in terms of its capabilities) corresponds to the task at hand, regardless of its area of responsibility, is chosen as a "support" unit. The Duvedevan subdivision, which is one of the "support", was repeatedly involved in such tasks, sometimes successfully, sometimes not.
For example, in 1996, a sergeant from the Harbor Motorized Infantry Brigade, Nachshon Vauxman, was taken hostage. He had a vacation, and on the way from the unit to the city, he asked for a lift in a car in which sat several Palestinians disguised as Jews who turned out to be members of one of the Arab terrorist organizations. Apparently, the Palestinians are also studying and in practice applying the experience of the Israelis' struggle against them. N. Voxman was taken to Ramallah and hidden in one of the buildings. The operation to free him was carried out by an anti-terrorist group from the Sayeret Matkal unit. Everything went well at first. Fighters from the Duvedevan unit secretly surrounded the area adjacent to the building with the hostage and three terrorists in it, and allowed the special forces from the assault group, along with the dog handler and the dog, to approach the front door of the building unnoticed.
According to the plan, after the explosion, the dog was to be launched into the building, and then the members of the assault group were to break in. But the successful part of the operation ended there. The installed charge was insufficient to immediately knock the door down. While they were preparing another, the terrorists had time to prepare for the "warm" reception of the assault group. In addition, after the explosion of the first charge, one of the terrorists killed the hostage with three shots to the head. Immediately after the explosion of the second charge, the group, simultaneously with the dog, burst into the room and came under a hurricane of terrorist fire. As a result, the commander of the group, Captain Nir Poraz, was killed, and another member of the group was seriously wounded, but managed to kill one of the terrorists. As a result, all three terrorists were killed, but the hostage was also killed. Analyzing the results of the operation, the Israeli command came to the conclusion that that the main reason for its failure was the incorrect calculation of the charge for knocking out the door. This deprived the assault group of the surprise factor and gave the terrorists time to prepare for the assault. And one of the reasons for the losses among the assault group was that they burst into the room at the same time as the dog, and not a few seconds later, without using it as a distraction.
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