"Without calling a spade a spade, we multiply the misery of our world."
Look the war in the face
By m.tyzhden.ua5 minView Original
As early as March 2014, it was obvious that Russia had waged war against Ukraine, albeit in the Western world only for Ukrainians. However, the victim of aggression decided not to call it a war. The reasons and circumstances can be understood:
1) the Anschluss of Crimea happened so quickly that the language did not return to call it a military operation; the reaction of the international community, which led to sanctions, was reduced to talk of illegal annexation rather than a military operation;
2) the fighting in Donbass was called "anti-terrorist operation", which was to emphasize the denial of any legitimacy of the separatists and to record the attitude towards them as terrorists. Such terminology makes sense, but by calling what is happening an anti-terrorist operation, Ukraine has created many inconveniences because it has made the essence of the conflict unclear and has not called things by their names. The same confusion between police and military operations led to the catastrophic consequences of the 2001 "war on terror" declared by George W. Bush. I prefer the current official version of the situation in Donbass. The French writer Albert Camus wrote that "without calling a spade a spade, we multiply the misery of our world."
"Living Shield": what is behind the phrase of the President of Russia about who will be the Russian army in the Crimea
Author author Oksana Chelysheva journalist FAITID.ORG4 min View original
Yesterday I decided not to make any comments to Vladimir Putin's press conference on the situation in Ukraine. Too hot emotions were caused by his answer to the journalist's question about who he was going to fight in Ukraine. Personally, I was most impressed by the two theses of the Russian president.
First, he stated that there were no Russian servicemen in the Crimea, as "the post-Soviet space is full of uniforms that resemble uniforms ..." and "you can buy them in any store." Secondly, that "if they give the order to start armed action, it is only to protect Ukrainian citizens."
The next phrase, said by Russian President Vladimir Putin, made me shiver ... As they say, "there was a chill between the shoulder blades": "And let someone from the military try to shoot at their people, behind whom we will stand, not in front, but behind . Let them try to shoot women and children! And I will look at those who will give such an order in Ukraine. "
I waited for the printout of the speech on the Kremlin's website : you can't throw words out of a song. This is exactly what is said: "We will not stand in front, but behind women and children" ... I draw your attention to the fact that the President of the Russian Federation consciously addresses his threat to the Ukrainian military: "... let someone from the military try to shoot in their people. "
What would that mean? I do not allow the idea that he somehow failed to formulate his opinion. Everything was said responsibly. And with the knowledge of the case.
The Russian army has resorted to using "live shields" more than once during two Chechen campaigns. In March 1996, during the capture of the village of Samashki, women, children and the elderly were used to cover the APCs. The report of the memorial center "Behind the backs of civilians" provides numerous testimonies of those who were used for these purposes. For example, a resident of Samashok Ismailov Shepa said:
"When women and children get off, they tell us, 'Go, get up.' We all stood in front of a tank or armored personnel carrier. Next to COCA and her boys. They are firing everywhere ... As we were walking, I saw that Shamsutdin's house was on fire, and he was coming with us. "
The same methods were used during the "sweeps" in the area of the 15th town of Grozny, carried out on August 11, 12 and 17, 1996. It is worth noting that the commander of the unit that carried out the sweep ordered the execution of three residents of the area who were identified as ethnic Russians.
There were also examples of other attitudes of Russian soldiers to civilians. In the same report of the Memorial the certificate of Aishat Hadasheva that in her house the Russian soldiers decided not to take anyone hostage is resulted. Another witness, Sultan Larsanov, told of an officer who released the hostages, saying that "he also has children and he will not take sin upon his soul." Among the hostages who suffered as a result of such actions were both Chechens and ethnic Russians, residents of Grozny. One of the oldest elderly people who was injured was, for example, Ivan Nikolaevich Evmenyev (b. 1910). The Memorial report also noted the use of doctors from the 9th City Hospital as a "living shield" in August 1996.
During the 2nd Chechen campaign, "live shields" of civilians were used during the fighting and the ensuing punitive operation in the village of Gehi-Chu on February 6-7, 2000, as well as during the battle for the village of Komsomolskoye in March 2000 (monograph Dmitrovsky, Baysaev, Chelyshev "International Tribunal for Chechnya" (Volume 2, Chapter 40.3)
During the Russian-Chechen armed conflict, "living shields" of peaceful or hostage-taking people were used by Chechen resistance forces. One of the most odious facts is the "live shield" of the hostages in Beslan on September 3, 2004.
From the point of view of international criminal law, such actions constitute a war crime . Moreover, the threat of using "living shields" in an international conflict, expressed by the Supreme Commander of the army of another country, can be seen as incitement to commit a war crime. The use of "live shields" is prohibited by Article 23 (1) of the Third Geneva Convention (concerning prisoners of war), Article 28 of the Fourth Geneva Convention (concerning the protection of civilians and Article 51 (7) of the Additional Protocol).
While working on a study on Chechnya in the field of international criminal law, we analyzedall decisions of two international tribunals: on Rwanda and the Former Yugoslavia. The ICTY recognized the use of human shields as a form of war crime, either in the form of ill-treatment or an attack on human dignity. Thus, in the decision in the case of Blaskic, the Trial Chamber established: “On April 20, 1993, the villagers <...> served as human shields for the headquarters of the accused in Vitez. Because they were Muslim civilians or Muslims no longer taking part in hostilities, the Trial Chamber post that they had been ill-treated as a result of the act. ”In the case of Aleksovsky, the Court ruled that from digging battle trenches are encroachments on human dignity. "
Thus, the use of human shields includes signs of multiple war crimes and can be seen as a "mixed war crime", and the public statement by the commander-in-chief that "children and women may go ahead of his troops" as incitement to commit it. .
I must say that it is not only difficult for Ukraine to call war a war. In fact, since 1945, it has become increasingly difficult for democracies to understand it and use appropriate terms. After World War II, there were many wars, but they are not called anyway (the terms "events", "guerrillas", "frozen conflict", "police operation", "humanitarian intervention", etc.) or add some adjectives (as if the word " war "has fallen into disuse, because, you see, it must be" cold "," hybrid "," asymmetric "," unconventional "or something else). In particular, the Cold War has made the notion of "war" and its perception vague: deterrence against the background of guarantees of mutual destruction has introduced such a phenomenon as widespread and at the same time unrealistic war, as military action has become unlikely, if not impossible.
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Such ideas were formed in the West, but not in the Soviet Union. During the Cold War, during periods of crisis and detente, the so-called balance of fear did not prevent the USSR from planning and preparing everything necessary for the resolution of conventional wars, in particular on the European front. In the 1970s and 1980s, despite the economic failure (and perhaps because of it), the Soviet Union developed a strategic doctrine and highly effective military force for this purpose, absorbing a significant part of its material and intellectual resources through military projects and ruthlessly neglecting civilian needs. At that time, experts mostly did not realize that the USSR was really preparing for war, that is, a strategy for overcoming the West by force - aggression and intimidation. Most experts and leaders did not believe: they thought that detente was inevitable, that the Soviet Union was ready for a peaceful settlement,
This approach was especially widespread in Europe, as if the war on European soil was no longer in the minds of Europeans. There was no military alternative to pacification, not only because of the significant superiority of the Soviet conventional forces, but also because of the lack of strategic thinking among Europeans, who were convinced that they did not need it, because they could rely entirely on the French nuclear forces. The Cold War was not perceived as a real threat. It has become, so to speak, a postmodern negative concept: containment has virtually made conflict impossible. This vision was widespread not only among politicians and the public, but also among powerful military strategists.
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General Lucien Poirier, one of the founders of the French nuclear force, wrote in 1978: "We are now in an era of general political and strategic rationality." This is an imaginary strategy in which weapon systems perform only a semiotic (sic!) Function. […] Nothing happens precisely because strategic models convincingly explain "what will happen when…" (quote from the book "Facing the war" (Paris, 1981) by the Greek-French philosopher Cornelius Kastoriadis). Thirty years later, General Poirier, then retired, did not change his mind: despite the end of the US-Soviet duopoly game and the increase in the number of nuclear powers, he still believed in "the rationalization effect of nuclear power" (Le Monde, May 27, 2006). ). Such naive (or paranoid) "logic" still paralyzes Western strategic thinking. Finally,
The facts reinforced that frivolous thinking: after the catastrophe in Afghanistan (1979-1989), it seemed that the Soviet empire had surrendered. Those who believed that the West was threatened by war because the fallen "edge of socialism" remained an aggressive military empire were wrong. Even at the domestic level, the Soviet Union renounced military methods. In 1981, Brezhnev flatly refused to fight Solidarity, despite the desperate appeals of the Polish Communists. Gorbachev later took the same position when Erich Honecker asked to "defend socialism" in East Germany "with arms." It seemed that along with the ideological, the military empire also collapsed.
That strategic and intellectual horizon should not be forgotten, because it is, although ancient, but still a significant root cause of Western weakness in relations with modern Russia. We do not want to face the war because we have lost sight of what it really is. And this is the realization of political aspirations through force and strategic maneuvers. However, political intentions do not necessarily imply a rational connection between goals and means. This nuance was pointed out by Karl von Clausewitz, who called war an aggravation of extremes, but tried to rationalize it in his famous and deceptive aphorism: "War is a continuation of politics by other means." The desire to win by force creates a willingness to various "rational" calculations: rationality is extremely flexible. This game, despite some tactical retreats, was played by the Soviet Union,
Read also: Recent wars: the last argument
To look the war in the face does not necessarily mean that one must choose or accept the armed conflict as a solution. It is a question of acknowledging the readiness of the other side for war. And here the question is not whether Moscow wants it. "Russia does not want war, it wants victory," is a sharp and ironic comment by Kastoriadis in 1981 that has not lost its relevance. There was not just a cold war and ideological competition between the West and the East, but a real war. This is an inconvenient idea, so statesmen and public opinion prefer to ignore it. The West may have "won the Cold War," but it did not fully understand what had happened. They still do not understand this, despite the sober thinking of such intellectuals and strategists as Philip Petersen today (see Week, № 38/2018) or Kastoriadis in the 1980s.
In order not to fall into the trap of Russian lies and to prevent numerous dangers from confusing and paralyzing us, the West must eradicate the Cold War from the Soviet / Russian imperialist war against it. One war ended in 1991, the other is still going on. And in this second Ukraine is only advanced
— Amphetamine & Happy (aka Бугурт і Нейролептики) (@CASBT_OSINT) May 16, 2021Просмотры:
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