DOI :: Drones in Russian Army | The strengths and weaknesses of Russia's military | Russian weapons in a special operation in Ukraine: expert Linin gave a detailed analysis | Russian Drones Are Playing a Major Role in the War Against Ukraine

 

Drones in Russian Army

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CASBT_OSINT у Твіттері: «🤦 The Russian Army, the second in the world, showed their next advanced technology, namely the control of the Orlan-10 UAV. As it turned out, the control is done with the cheapest Chinese game joystick. It seems that there is not enough money for more advanced technology. https://t.co/8b9bSFpOdW» / Твіттер

🤦 The Russian Army, the second in the world, showed their next advanced technology, namely the control of the Orlan-10 UAV.

As it turned out, the control is done with the cheapest Chinese game joystick.
It seems that there is not enough money for more advanced technology. pic.twitter.com/8b9bSFpOdW

— CASBT_OSINT (@casbt_osint)

By dfnc.ru8 minView Original

Author Pavel Rumyantsev.

After the World War II, the progress in electronics, radio equipment, and development of automated control system allowed the leading world powers to develop the first prototypes of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) by the early 1960s. Shortly after UAVs appeared on the scene, they took a very important position in the field of aerial reconnaissance by performing part of reconnaissance aircraft functions. Along with the new possibilities for military applications, UAVs offered two breakthrough advantages – they are far cheaper than an aircraft and, moreover, the loss of UAV has an incomparably less damage effect than the loss of a reconnaissance aircraft with a crew onboard.

UAVs in the USSR: One Step from Prosperity to Decay

By the early 1970s, the USA and the USSR developed series-produced models of tactical UAVs such as the AMQ-34 FireBee and Tu-141 Reis that opened the new era for drone applications. These UAVs were able to effectively accomplish various types of aerial reconnaissance missions over the enemy territory, covering hundreds of kilometers and transmitting real-time intelligence data to the command station. Tactical UAVs such as the Soviet Tu-143 able to perform deep reconnaissance in the frontline area were also developed. The Soviet Union took leading positions in development, production and application of UAVs. For example, during 16 years of production, since 1974, over 950 Reis UAVs were produced. By the late 1980s, the Soviet combined-arms armies included full UAV wings that provided in-depth frontline area aerial reconnaissance.

The collapse of the Soviet Union had very tragic and far-reaching consequences for all sectors of the Russian defense industry, including the production of unmanned aerial vehicles. First of all, due to the total lack of financing the most powerful UAV grouping had rapidly degraded. As a result, the Russian army was thrown back for decades in terms of possibilities and means of reconnaissance. Second, new UAV development projects were terminated, as the world faced a vigorous progress in development of UAVs. Western countries’ armies began to use small-sized tactical UAVs, medium-range drones and even “intercontinental” UAVs able to fly over thousands of kilometers at a very high altitude. Russia had nothing to boast of, except the Pchela UAV, which was developed to provide target destination for the Smerch systems, heavy multiple rocket launchers. Attempts to use this UAV for aerial reconnaissance during the wars in Chechnya and South Ossetia showed discouraging results.

War in South Ossetia – Combat Test

As a result, by the mid-2000s, Russia’s gap in development of UAVs had reached 15–20 years in comparison to the leading military powers while the Russian army was fully deprived of such a tool for performing combat operations. The war in South Ossetia obviously displayed these discoursing results. To accomplish tactical reconnaissance missions, Russian troops had to operate in the old-fashioned way, using reconnaissance groups. The lack of applicable reconnaissance means during this war caused combat casualties. On August 9, 2008, the battalion task force (BTF) of the 135th motorized rifle regiment made an attempt to raise a blockade of Russian peacekeeping forces (blocked in the peacekeeping forces’ compound on the outskirts of the city of Tskhinvali) that nearly resulted in a disaster. In the morning on August 9, due to the lack of reconnaissance means, Russian troops failed to detect the deployment of a large grouping of Georgian forces. As a result, the unblocking group of Russian troops suddenly encountered the main forces of the Georgian army and was blocked itself. Later, in the course of an intense battle in the streets of Tskhinvali against superior Georgian forces, the battalion tactical group of the 135th regiment lost 10 KIA and a few tens of WIA. Only a fast response by sending reinforcements, plus heavy artillery and air strikes delivered in due time saved the BTF from wipeout. If the Russian troops operating in South Ossetia had had at least a single UAV, they could easily have observed the entire area of combat operations and locate the disposition of the enemy forces and, therefore, avoid fatal consequences and save a large number of lives.

The war in South Ossetia revealed an urgent need for the complete upgrading of the whole system of communications, troops command and control and reconnaissance in the Russian army. This became one of the main goals of the largest military reform in modern Russia that was initiated shortly after the war. This reform was intended to expand Russian army informatization to a great extent and help the army to adapt to the so-called next-gen “network centric warfare”. Reconnaissance and real-time data transmission play one of the key roles in this concept. However, the implementation of this concept is not possible without UAVs and Russia has made substantial efforts to develop them.

As far back as 2009, Russia purchased a certain number of Israeli UAVs of various classes in order to study and familiarize with the best practices available (for the time being, Israel is actually the worldwide leader in development of UAVs and has a formidable experience in the drone combat employment) while many Russian companies have launched UAV development projects to be tested and approved by military customers.

Cornerstone – Orlan-10 UAV

The main goal was to develop small-sized tactical UAVs. Looking like model aircraft made by airplane modeling amateurs, these UAVs when disassembled may be carried by 1-2 persons; they require a small catapult to be launched and are able to land anywhere on small-sized pads. These UAVs may be employed even by small troops (at the level of the company) to provide real-time intelligence data acquisition. They are able to hover for hours and observe the entire space within a radius of a few dozens of kilometers. The critical disadvantages of these models are their data transmission lines vulnerable to EW jamming and high vulnerability to small-caliber anti-aircraft artillery strikes.

By the early 2010s, Russian companies demonstrated a large number of UAV models; however, only three models eventually reached the state testing phase. While only the Orlan-10 UAV model had passed all applicable tests. It was put into service and series production in 2013. Over 200 Orlan-10 UAVs have been produced so far, as most of Russian army’s combined-arms brigades and divisions include companies armed with such UAVs. Actually, the development and large-scale production of the Orlan-10 UAVs to be supplied to the army allows Russia to take back its position as the worldwide leader in development of UAVs. Even at the testing stage, the Orlan-10 UAV has managed to impress military customers. With its weight of 14 kg only and the flight speed of 100–150 km/h, this UAV is able to observe the combat operational zone reaching up to120 km and to ensure the operational endurance up to 16 hours. The most important thing is that the Orlan-10 UAV is built into the Integrated Tactical Command Control System (ITCCS) and may broadcast real-time intelligence data to all the combat vehicles equipped with the ITCCSs, i.e. to tanks, artillery units, infantry combat vehicles, armored personnel carriers, etc. Data transmission is enabled via a high security encrypted communication channel. The UAV may be used as an air gunnery spotter (in particular, for such modified self-propelled gun systems as the Msta-S howitzer or the next-gen Koalitsiya system) and offers multiple options for payload carrying. For example, these UAVs may be used for electronic reconnaissance and even for jamming the enemy’s tactical radio communication systems. Orlan-10 UAVs may be interconnected within a wide network. This option allows to enhance their default high operational efficiency drastically.

Orlan-10 UAVs constantly demonstrate the highest performance during large-scale military exercises and Russian army’s combat readiness checks. These drones proved to be very useful when observing relocations of Ukrainian troops in the zone near the Russian border during the war in the Eastern part of Ukraine in 2014. Now, they are successfully employed by Russia for its air operations in Syria.

Catch Up and Surpass

From year to year Russia intensifies the production of UAVs. For the last few years, the number of UAVs operated by the Russian army has been multiplied. In addition to the development and production of UAVs, various methods and concepts of their employment are constantly being tested. To be sure, for a few years Russia has managed to shorten nearly 20-year gap in development of small-sized UAVs and has successfully mastered the concept of “network centric warfare”. Nonetheless, Russian designers and engineers have a lot of work to develop UAVs. Despite infallible success in development of short-range UAVs and manually operated UAVs, for the time being, Russia has not developed medium-range drones, not to mention long-range solutions or attack UAVs. For instance, the U.S. Reaper UAV is able to carry over 1,000 kg of combat load and up to 4 Hellfire anti-tank missiles or the similar amount of JDAM-class (Joint Direct Attack Munition) guided bombs.

For now, Russia is intensely developing the Dozor-600 UAV as an equivalent to the U.S. Predator system, an attack UAV. Some advanced long-range UAVs are also under development. For example, M.P. Simonov Experimental Design Bureau (formerly named Sokol, Kazan) and Transas (St. Petersburg) have co-developed the prototype of the heavy UAV Altius. The development prototype has already been built at Kazan Aviation Factory and even occasionally “spotted” on Google maps. According to available data, this 5-ton UAV is able to cover up to 10,000 km and will be fitted with all types of electronic reconnaissance equipment. Heavy UAVs are unlikely to be supplied to the Russian army until the 2020s. To be sure, their appearance will give nearly immense possibilities for various applications. For example, there are some long-term projects to develop the Airborne Early Warning (AEW) unmanned aircraft based on a heavy UAV. Experts estimate that just 20-25 drones of this class are able to provide 24-hour continuous radar field over the entire gigantic territory of Russia (for now, the lack of a continuous radar field over the country’s territory is a serious problem). Probably, such drones will be used for specific onboard applications for the future Russian aircraft carrier.

No doubt that few years will pass and Russia will again become one of the worldwide leaders in development of UAVs, as an intense employment of UAVs during potential armed conflicts allows to save lives of military personnel and provide better combat effectiveness.

🤦 The Russian Army, the second in the world, showed their next advanced technology, namely the control of the Orlan-10 UAV.

As it turned out, the control is done with the cheapest Chinese game joystick.
It seems that there is not enough money for more advanced technology. pic.twitter.com/8b9bSFpOdW

— CASBT_OSINT (@casbt_osint) April 21, 2022

The strengths and weaknesses of Russia's military

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ABOUT DW 

Deutsche Welle

4 min

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The US, Russia, and China are considered the world's strongest nations when it comes to military power, with the US the undisputed number one. Even so, Russia's still has plenty of arrows in its quiver, most notably the massive nuclear arsenal of some 1,550 deployed nuclear warheads.

Read more: NATO chief Jens Stoltenberg urges calm as Moscow rattles Baltic saber

Leaving the nuclear weapons aside, however, the US has an overwhelming advantage in conventional forces, including a much stronger navy and air force, Russian military analyst Aleksandr Golts told DW.

China, according to Golts, would also have the advantage of numbers in any conventional showdown with Russia. In other areas, however, things are not as clear-cut.

"Russia's air force is much stronger than the Chinese for now," he told DW. "It questionable about the navy, as the Chinese are now undertaking a very ambitious program of ship building and they are much more successful in building a [global] blue Navy fleet than Russia."

Still, while Russia's battleships are old, they are often equipped with very modern cruise missiles, according to Golts.

However, the military expert warns that ranking countries by military power is "more or less useless" as armed forces' effectiveness depends on the goals set by the nation's leaders.

Read more: EU outlines plans for 'military Schengen zone'

Nuclear submarines are part of Russia's navy

'We don't always know where the target is'

This point of view is echoed by Russian journalist and military analyst Pavel Felgenhauer, who warns that real-life conflicts depend on many different variables, including the geography and the people involved.

"It's like predicting a result of a soccer match: Yes, basically, Brazil should beat America in soccer, but I have seen Americans beat Brazil in South Africa, at the Confederations Cup," he told DW. "You never know the result until the game is played."

Felgenhauer notes that Russia is lacking in many areas of modern military technology, including drone design and production, electronic components, as well as radar and satellite reconnaissance. For example, Russia is currently producing surveillance drones under an Israeli license, and it is completely lacking in assault drone capability.

Russia is also working on modernizing its command and control centers, which serve to process information from the battlefield and feed it to the troops.

"That's what the Russian military is talking about: Yes, we have weapons, including long-range weapons, but our reconaissance capabilities are weaker than our attack capabilities," Felgenhauer said. "So we have-long range, sometimes precision guided weapons, but we don't always know where the target is."

No more German and French satellites

These problems were exacerbated by the 2014 Crimean crisis, according to the analyst. In the years leading up to the showdown with the West, Moscow was spending at least $500 Million per year in the US shopping for the so-called double-use merchandize, which can be used for both military and civilian purposes.

"It was electronic components for Russian weapons and satellites, different kinds of special glass and steel," Felgenhauer says.

Similarly, "France and Germany were making double-use satellites, which were basically military satellites, recon satellites, for Russia. And all that kind of stopped."

A Russian tank in Aleppo, Syria

Good old Soviet weapons

Faced with the West's embargo, Russia is also working to develop its own drones and close the technological gap in other areas. However, the breakdown of the Soviet Union left Moscow not only weaker in terms of territory and the number of troops, but also when it comes to military suppliers, according to the experts.

"The Soviet Union had an idiotic, but at least very logical economy," Aleksandr Golts says. "It had nothing to do with market economy, but the main goal for any enterprise on Soviet territory, whether it was designated as military or civilian, was to be ready to produce military goods and equipment in case of war. After the fall of the Soviet Union, these systems disappeared."

On the other hand, the legacy of the Soviet Union is still very much present in the modern Russian army, as many of its cutting edge systems "are the development of good, old Soviet systems and the modernization of that type of technology," says Golts.

One such weapon is the decades-old Su-25 attack plane, designed to support ground troops. Russia recently announced that the latest version of the aircraft has entered production.

"It is very well known to all the people who participated in the (1980's) Afghan war, such as myself," he told DW. "But, its designers insist it only looks like the old Su-25, that all the avionics are absolutely modern […] and it has shown how good it was during the Syrian war."

20,000 tanks ?

In addition to the nuclear arsenal, there is one area in which Russia is clearly number one. Recently, the Kremlin announced that Russia had more tanks than any other nation in the world, notes Felgenhauer.

"Unofficially, I have seen figures of up to 20,000, which would mean that Russia has more tanks than all the NATO countries put together."

Most of the European powers reduced their tank capabilities after the end of the Cold War, focusing instead on conflicts with terrorist and guerilla groups. This, according to Felgenhauer, puts them at a massive disadvantage in the event of a ground war in Europe.

Read more: German military short on tanks for NATO mission

"Germany has only 300 tanks left right now," he says. "Britain has, I think, 250, and France also something close to that."

In the event of all-European war, Russia also holds a logistical advantage over the West, according to Felgenhauer. Where NATO would need months to mobilize it full strength, Russia would be able to bring in reinforcements on a much tighter schedule. 

Russian weapons in a special operation in Ukraine: expert Linin gave a detailed analysis

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azlyrics.com.az

10 min

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“Calibers”, “Iskanders”, “Lancets” – but there is something to work on

The decision on a special operation to protect the republics of Donbass was made, including taking into account the capabilities of the Russian Armed Forces . In other words, if there were no such opportunities, including the latest weapons, then they would hardly have decided on an operation. And these opportunities in recent years, admittedly, have grown significantly. MK asked a military expert what weapons systems Russian troops use.

Photo: Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation

About the new Russian weapons became widely known about seven years ago, with the start of the operation of the Russian Aerospace Forces in Syria. There, for the first time, long-range cruise missiles “Caliber” were lit up. Then the world learned about the “Daggers”, “Zircons” and much more. Weapons were demonstrated in the exercises, making the US and NATO pretty nervous. According to experts, including foreign ones, some samples of Russian weapons are superior to their American counterparts.

The German Der Spiegel wrote a few years ago: “According to experts, the Russian army has probably become stronger than all the EU armies combined. After the reforms, the new capabilities of the Russian army worry even the US military.”

Now Russian weapons are being used to demilitarize Ukraine and turn into trash all the weapons that it received from the US and NATO countries. The special operation to denazify and demilitarize Ukraine has been going on for three weeks. The military department assures: everything is according to plan. Military expert Yevgeny Linin told MK about the strengths and weaknesses of our weapons.

“First of all, I cannot fail to note the effectiveness of our Caliber cruise missiles,” the expert said. – They are practically not knocked down in modern conditions, and unmistakably hit targets. The same can be said about Iskander-M short-range ballistic missiles. During the special operation, none of these missiles was intercepted, and all assigned targets were destroyed.

I would also like to mention the effective Kh-31 and Kh-58 air-to-ground missiles, which were used from our Su-30 tactical fighters and Su-34 front-line bombers.

X-31 is a short-range air-to-ground missile that effectively hits targets using laser illumination or a radio beam.

The X-58 missile was designed to destroy enemy air defense systems, namely radar stations. That is, if the ground-based radar works on radiation, the aircraft's equipment detects it, the missile is sent to that place and automatically hits the target based on a signal that comes from the enemy's radar station.

Both of these missiles are the development of Soviet designers, and have been in service since the 80s of the last century. Of course, they undergo periodic upgrades, but, nevertheless, we cannot say that this is the “last word” of science and technology.

For me, however, it remains not entirely clear why our aviation stopped flying for three days, from February 25 to 28. In fact, that's when we started losing. Because while it was working, both ground targets of the enemy and air defense systems were effectively destroyed.

– Definitely – drones. According to official data, there are 67 companies armed with drones in our Armed Forces. The total number is more than two thousand aircraft for various purposes. This makes Russia the second largest army in the world after Israel in terms of their number. Personally, I have one question: where are they? Why are there few videos using the same Orlan-10 devices?

MK Help: Orlan-10 “- reconnaissance drone. Able to work within a radius of up to 120 km, climb to a height of up to 5 km and stay in the air for up to 14 hours. It is equipped with day and night cameras, target illumination equipment and an electronic warfare system. Orlan is used, as a rule, in threes: one from a height of up to 1.5 km conducts reconnaissance, the second covers the EW complex a little higher, the third from 4-5 km relays the signal to the base

Further. We found ourselves practically without shock drones, which are simply necessary. We have a few units of Orion devices weighing a ton.

In general, the effectiveness of attack drones, that is, those that are capable of not only conducting reconnaissance, but also carrying weapons – bombs and missiles, can be judged by the example of all armed conflicts of recent years. This is Nagorno-Karabakh and Yemen. In general, Karabakh, like a litmus test, showed what an advantage drones have over air defense systems, even such advanced ones as our Pantsir-S1.

And this despite the fact that the cost of drones is disproportionately lower. The drone itself and the weapons it carries are consumables. It's not a $100 million plane. No. This is a small, as a rule, apparatus: an engine, a minimum set of avionics and navigation aids. While the same “Pantsir” is the latest technological equipment, means of intercepting and destroying air targets, as well as a full-fledged crew.

During the special operation, it became obvious that if the drones were not destroyed all at once (and as it turned out, they were not destroyed in full, because downed drones still appear in the daily reports of our military), then it is almost impossible to defend against them.< /p>

On the video on the Web, you can find examples of the use of Ukrainian “Bayraktars” against our air defense systems. Moreover, they hit when our complexes are in a non-working state. Air defense systems, unfortunately, cannot operate continuously, as you can quickly “burn” their resource, and repairs will be required.

– There are objectively very few drones capable of striking ground targets. Of the weapons used, we saw only loitering guided munitions. We did not see a single missile in the case, which should be in the nomenclature of attack drones. Although earlier at the same exhibitions a large number of corresponding weapons were demonstrated.

– See what happens, even if the “Orions” were used, it cannot be said that this is happening en masse. I dare to suggest that all these ammunition that were created for drones are either prototypes so far, or were produced in very limited quantities.

I cannot ignore the issue of using electronic warfare (EW). I personally think that there are problems here too. Electronic warfare equipment cannot operate in all bands at the same time, and the drones used by the Ukrainian side, even the simplest ones, flying anywhere and somehow losing contact with the base, use several frequency bands for their work.

There is no point in even talking about Bayraktars. They have the ability to control even from a satellite. Simply put, electronic warfare equipment is practically unable to interfere with their control systems, and it is unrealistic to intercept them.

We see that Ukraine is in such a deplorable state of affairs that even without any electronic warfare, drones fly away, God knows where. In the same Croatia, in Zagreb, a Ukrainian drone fell, which they apparently dug up somewhere from Soviet warehouses. And electronic warfare has absolutely nothing to do with it. It's just that Ukraine's equipment is already so old, it works on the verge of its capabilities.

It turns out that electronic warfare stations are expensive equipment that requires constant protection and maintenance, which does not fully justify itself. Plus, it is quite energy-intensive, which means that you cannot install it in an open field. It needs to be covered by air defense systems, the same “Shells”, which, as we found out, are also used in a limited number. And what happens? Drones, both reconnaissance and strike, fly freely. And the latter also destroy our air defense systems.

– Observers. In theory, we should have thousands of them there. Their task is to constantly hang in the sky and record all the movements of Ukrainian troops. But that doesn't happen either. Why? Personally, it is difficult for me to answer this question.

We have good Kub-UAV drones. At least we know they apply. This is a loitering ammunition or kamikaze drone, which can stay in the air for up to one hour on average. During this time, he must detect the target and hit it.

Another of our Lancet-1 drones has the same properties. Moreover, about a year ago, the Lancet-3 was tested in Syria, which is also capable of staying in the air for quite a long time and hitting targets at a distance of up to 40 km.

At the same time, they fly on electric motors using batteries, practically silently. They are difficult to shoot down, as they are quite small. For understanding, the Lancet-3 weighs only 12 kilograms.

The tasks of such drones include hitting targets that are located in urban areas. This minimizes the destruction and the number of casualties among the civilian population. A very useful weapon. But how massively they are now used in Ukraine, we do not know.

Ukrainian media published photos of fragments of our fallen drones. For what reason they did not reach the targets, it is difficult to say. Perhaps the Ukrainian electronic warfare equipment worked, or maybe just the batteries were not charged. Now it's impossible to find out for sure.

– No, you don't think that I'm trying to convey to you that everything is bad with us. I just try to be objective, and this absolutely does not mean that our army has nothing to be proud of. It is not for nothing that the whole world, albeit reluctantly, recognizes her as one of the strongest.

Take, for example, our Zircon hypersonic missile, which is used for naval combat. Its range is about five hundred kilometers. It is difficult to say how expedient it is to apply it now, when Ukraine has practically no fleet. But having such a missile in service, we provide ourselves with an absolute advantage in the Black Sea. And I will say more: now the very fact of the presence of such missiles on board our ships serves as a deterrent effect on the use of the fleet by Ukraine's friends from NATO. True, we already understood that these “friends” turned out to be so-so, but nevertheless, at the initial stage of the special operation, there was a possibility that they could appear. And the Zircons just acted as a kind of stop factor from unnecessary interference.

All of our modernized equipment demonstrates its advantage. Let's take our T-90 tanks, they really showed their invulnerability against the same advertised American Javelin anti-tank missiles. There is a video on the Web in which even when the T-90 is under fire, it continues to move. The explosion of ammunition above it, which, in theory, was supposed to burn it from above with a cumulative jet, since the turret is the most unprotected place in the tank, showed that the T-90 can even cope with this. The dynamic protection that was used on them also confirms the effectiveness of our tanks.

Run-in BTR-82 – Russian armored personnel carrier, which is a deep modernization of the BTR-80. It has been adopted by the Russian army since 2013. No matter what anyone says, it is clear that modern weapons are capable of destroying them, but comparing them even with the predecessors of the BTR-72, you see: the difference is colossal. Because the BTR-72 was vulnerable even to small arms fire, such as machine guns.

Tested in the case, and more than once, small arms, Kalashnikov assault rifles. The conditions of the special operation are definitely not hothouse: high humidity, temperature fluctuations with minus values ​​at night, dirt and dustiness. But our “shooter” copes with everything.

I will also praise the Msta-S self-propelled artillery mount. This is perhaps the best artillery system in the world today.

After it became clear that the Ukrainians were actually fighting, and not running away at the sight of the Russian army, after several of our helicopters were shot down, it became clear that it was dangerous to use Mi-17 transport helicopters without escort of attack helicopters. From now on, the losses of our turntables tend to zero. Attack Ka-52s are very well protected. The footage of the Ka-52 moving away from the Stinger missile, firing off heat traps and maneuvering, is proof of this.

I cannot but praise the Soviet designers and developers of the Su-25 attack aircraft. The Russian Ministry of Defense showed video evidence of how, even if the Stinger hit one of the aircraft, it was able to land, saving the life of the crew.

– Tochka-U is a single-stage solid-propellant missile controlled throughout the flight. The problem with its interception is the shortest possible flight time to the target: 136 seconds for a maximum flight range of 120 kilometers.

To detect it (in order to detect the launch and calculate the flight path), the missile defense system must operate continuously, and the anti-missiles must be in constant readiness. To achieve this for marching units is almost impossible. It is also difficult to track the Tochka-U complex before the missile launch, since the launcher is mobile, and the preparation time for launch from the march is only 16 minutes. Therefore, they try to destroy such systems with the first blow at their locations. If it didn’t work out, they scan the area with the help of reconnaissance drones.

As a post-Soviet heritage, Ukraine had about 300 Tochka-U mobile complexes left. In 2014, they shot, according to some estimates, about 20 rockets. They sold part of the missiles to different countries, for example, to Yemen. At the beginning of the special operation, there were 20 launchers and, according to some sources, about 90 missiles.

We were able to destroy those storage sites that were known. But, apparently, based on the fact that launches still occur, this is not all. So they pop up from time to time. But I think that soon the problem with the Ukrainian “points” will be finally resolved.

Russian Drones Are Playing a Major Role in the War Against Ukraine

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Sam Cranny-Evans 

The National Interest

5 min

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Making accurate assessments of the technical landscape in the Russo-Ukrainian War is a challenge for an outsider. Ukraine’s information campaign has been effective in skewing the perception of the conflict. Russian information has been scarce, vague, or both. However, it is possible to build an assessment of Russia’s drone capabilities used in the conflict from various open sources. The evidence gathered of Russian losses since the conflict began suggests that the Russian Armed Forces (RuAF) did not enter the war with their unmanned aerial capabilities in place and ready to support its operations. However, it now seems Russia is moving towards the type of drone deployments that analysts expected from the outset.

Early Russian UAV Uses

The most notable first appearance of a Russian unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) was a strike reported by the Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) on March 4th that was launched by an Orion combat UAV. The Orion was the first armed UAV to enter service with the RuAF, having completed operational deployments in Syria around 2018. Like many Russian weapons systems, it conducted reconnaissance and strike missions in Syria as part of its development process. Despite its apparent success, however, Orion is not thought to have entered service until June 2020, and then only in limited numbers. It is not surprising to see the UAV used in Ukraine. The Orion serves a valuable military need for timely precision strike capabilities and reconnaissance, as well as a sense that the Russians can compete with Ukraine’s Bayraktar TB2s.

While the appearance of the Orion drone demonstrates Russian technological progress, it does not yet play a fundamental role in Russian war efforts. The less advanced Orlan-10 and Eleron-3 drones are far more important. These drones provide vital intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) functions for the RuAF at the tactical level. Russian motor rifle and tank brigads incorporate a UAV company that is divided into two platoons. One company fields short-range Orlan-10 and Takhion-4s, and the other operates close-range UAVs such as the Granat and Eleron families. The Orlan-10 has a range of 150 km and is capable of transmitting video footage gathered by its electro-optical payload in real time back to its ground control station via 3G and 4G datalinks. The Takhion-4 is a smaller design with a range of 40 km, an endurance of six hours and a payload including a thermal camera or digital video feed.

There have been reports of eleven different variants of Orlan-10, including the primary ISR variant and the RB-341V Leer-3, an electronic warfare variant. Leer-3 uses two Orlan-10s to perform international mobile subscriber identity-catcher (IMSI) and electronic warfare (EW) functions against the GSM-900 and GSM-1800 bands. These are the radio frequency bands allocated to mobile phones. Using modified Orlan-10s, Leer-3 can cover an area of 6 km and collect data on up to 2,000 cellular subscribers. The system was used in Ukraine in 2014 and 2015. Before the Russian invasion in 2022, soldiers in the 54th Ukrainian Brigade received the following texts to their mobile phones, “Moscow gave a go to the use of RF Armed Forces in the Donbas! There's still time to save your life and leave the JFO zone.” It is believed that this type of message may have been the work of Leer-3 and its Orlan-10s.

Evolving Roles for UAVs

There were few reports of Russian Orlan-10s and other UAVs in any other role at the start of the conflict. The way in which Russian units were dispersed and lacked coordination supports assumptions that UAVs were not used in the way that they were intended. However, an increase in the recovery of downed Orlan-10s since the third week of the invasion, as well as more regular video releases from the Russian MoD, indicates that this is no longer the case. Unconfirmed reports now indicate three key roles for the Orlan-10 in Ukraine: Convoy support and counter-sabotage reconnaissance, artillery spotting and correction, and ISR provision for reconnaissance-strike missions. The first role is obvious given the early reports of losses inflicted on Russian convoys. Some open-source data indicate that Russian vehicle and truck losses peaked in the first week and have fallen since. Assessing the cause of this change is difficult, but it is possible that the increase in convoy protection with UAVs has allowed the RuAF to reduce their losses and pre-empt Ukrainian ambushes.

The second mission is familiar for Russian artillery formations and has been used extensively in Ukraine since 2014. Video evidence released by the Russian MoD indicates that artillery strikes coordinated by UAVs, often with Orlan-10, include the use of laser guided 152 mm projectiles such as the 2K25 Krasnopol. A UAV illuminates a target with a laser to provide guidance onto the target. Past Russian publications indicated that these strikes would ideally be coordinated with unguided projectiles as well. However, as some of the strikes in Ukraine appear to be against singular vehicles, it is possible that the Russian artillery forces are choosing levels of force that are reasonably sufficient, rather than excessive in their application.

The third use of UAVs that has emerged is particularly ominous in its potential to inflict damage upon the Ukrainian forces. Reconnaissance-strike is the use of real-time reconnaissance and command and control to coordinate missile or long-range artillery strikes against a target of importance at operational depths. A prominent example of this in Ukraine is the missile strike on the Retroville Shopping Mall in Ukraine. UAV footage was ostensibly used to coordinate an initial strike by a long-range missile that destroyed Ukrainian multiple rocket launchers and a storage site for additional rockets.

These capabilities will improve Russia’s speed of response and the precision with which it can engage Ukrainian forces. This may become especially detrimental for the Ukrainian forces if the war becomes static and positional, which may benefit Russia’s pace of warfighting.

Sam Cranny-Evans joined RUSI as a Research Analyst in C4ISR in October 2021 having spent five years at the Janes Information Group where he finished as a lead analyst in land warfare platforms.

Image: Wikimedia.

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